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Abstract
This study aimed to determine if people would use social usefulness as a criterion when allocating
a kidney to potential recipients. Participants (N = 281) ranked hypothetical patients in order of
priority to receive the kidney, only using information on the patients’ volunteering record,
intelligence, emotional intelligence and attractiveness. The results showed that volunteers were
prioritized over non-volunteers, highly intelligent patients over those with average intelligence,
patients with high emotional intelligence over those with average emotional intelligence, and
good-looking patients over average-looking patients. There was little evidence of personal
favouritism. Implications and limitations are discussed.
Keywords: scarce medical resource allocation, social usefulness, personal favouritism
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Allocating scarce medical resources: Using social usefulness as a criterion.
Introduction
When the demand for a certain medical resource exceeds the supply of that resource, it is
termed a scarce medical resource. Allocation of scarce medical resources will remain an
interminable and contentious issue, for who is to decide to whom these resources should be
allocated, and by which criteria? The issue of scarce medical resource allocation is of interest not
only to ethicists, but also to psychologists, philosophers, policymakers and the general public. It
is, after all, money from the general public in the form of taxes that usually fund these allocation
programmes, and thus it is reasonable for the general public to want to have a say in how these
scarce resources are allocated to members of the society.
The ethics behind resource allocation
Traditionally, the two philosophical principles of utilitarianism and egalitarianism have
been used to underpin discussions concerning the ethics behind resource allocation methods (Lamb,
1990). There are however a number of other identifiable principles (see below).
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory because it focuses on the outcomes of actions
rather than the actions themselves. In accordance with utilitarianism, the best, or most ideal, action
is one that brings about maximum happiness, and the worst action is one causes maximum
unhappiness, where happiness is defined as “pleasure and the absence of pain” (pp. 10) whilst
unhappiness is defined as “pain, and the privation of pleasure” (Mill, 1863, pp. 10). In the context
of resource allocation, utilitarianism would endorse allocation to the person whose health and well-
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being would bring about most happiness in society, thus giving rise to individual judgments of
social worth (Banks, 1995).
The second philosophical perspective is egalitarianism, which is a deontological principle.
Deontology, in contrast to consequentialism, is focused on the act rather than the outcome and the
morality of the act is determined by a known and accepted set of rules (Broad, 1930). As such,
egalitarianism puts forth the rule that all individuals are equal in terms of social worth. However,
with scarce resources, some sort of selection usually has to be made.
Persad, Wertheimer and Emanuel (2009) demonstrated that these two philosophical
perspectives were insufficient to capture the complexity that surrounds the issue of resource
allocation. They elaborated on eight primary ethical principles for medical resource allocation. The
two utilitarian allocation methods are based on saving the most number of lives and the most
number of life-years, respectively. The lottery and first-come, first-served methods are more
individualistic and adopt an egalitarian approach in allocating resources. Prioritarianism, or
prioritising the disadvantaged, gives rise to two possible allocation methods: sickest first and
youngest first. The next were classified under social usefulness: instrumental value and reciprocity.
These are defined thus: Instrumental value- prioritising those with specific skills and usefulness such as
those producing a vaccine, or those who have agreed to improve their health following treatment and thus
requiring fewer resources (stop smoking, lose weight, etc.); Reciprocity – prioritising those who have
been useful.
Many studies show people’s preferences for egalitarianism (Dolan & Cookson, 2000,
Ratcliffe, 2000; Ubel, 1999; Wilmot, & Ratcliffe, 2002). There has been mixed support for the
youngest first principle (Rodríguez & Pinto, 2000; Mossialos & King, 1999; Schwappach, 2003;
Tong et al., 2010).
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Current allocation criteria
As the current study uses kidney transplant as the scarce medical resource to be allocated,
the kidney allocation systems of two major countries (UK and the USA) will be examined in detail.
The allocation criteria used in these two countries appear to incorporate several of Persad et al.’s
(2009) allocation principles, namely first-come, first-served and youngest first, with a heavy
emphasis on prognosis. There is no direct evidence for the prioritisation of the sickest, although it
is very likely that they are indirectly prioritised through the first-come, first-served principle as
their condition is likely to worsen the longer they remain on the waiting list. The lottery principle
is not used at all in either the US or the UK.
The present study
This study employs a similar methodology to the studies by Furnham (1996) and his
colleagues and investigates two previously studied variables (community service and intelligence)
and two untested variables (emotional intelligence, or EI, and physical attractiveness). These latter
variables were chosen as they reflect the social usefulness of an individual. It is assumed that EI
is an indication of social usefulness as EI people are better communicators, more empathic and
sought out by others for friendship (Petrides et al., 2016). Similarly physical attractiveness has
always been rated as a positive factors; in part because it has been shown to be an indicator of
health and fecundity (Swami & Furnham, 2008).
Some of the more recent studies have used Likert scales to measure participants’preference.
However, this study retains the rank-order method used in the older studies because it more
realistically simulates medical decision-making, where medical professionals have to choose one
patient over another. Even though the rank-order paradigm may be more demanding for
participants, findings from studies that use rank-order are consistent with the findings from the
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studies using the Likert scale (Furnham & Briggs, 1993; Furnham, 1996; Furnham & Petrides,
2007; Furnham. McClelland, & Drummond-Baxter, 2010; Furnham, Petrides, & Callahan, 2011).
Furthermore, in this study, participants are asked to elaborate on what criteria they used to rank
the patients, though very few did so (less than 10%). This would provide more insights into the
participants’ rationale for ranking a certain way.
The following hypotheses were proposed:
Hypothesis 1: Higher priority will be assigned to patients who volunteer over patients who
do not. Furnham, Simmons, and McClelland, (2000) found that there was a preference for
patients who participated in community service to be allocated to a kidney machine, over
patients who did not participate in community service. Allocation based on this variable is
according to the reciprocity principle, as it favours people who had contributed to society
(Persad et al., 2009).
Hypothesis 2: Highly intelligent patients will receive higher priority over patients with
average intelligence. This is based on previous research by Furnham, Thomas, and Petrides
(2002) and Wiseman (2006), and is likely due to the perception that highly intelligent
people are more valuable to society.
Hypothesis 3: Patients with high EI will receive higher priority over patients with average
EI. People with higher EI were found to be more agreeable and thus were more likeable
(Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004). Hence, they might be judged as possessing higher
instrumental value than people with average EI.
Hypothesis 4: Good-looking patients will receive higher priority over average-looking
patients. It is proposed that the halo effect would lead participants to believe that good-
looking individuals have other positive characteristics as well, thus having higher
ALLOCATING SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES
7
instrumental value (Miller, 1970). Another possible mechanism for this effect is
participants using attractiveness to judge the patients’ health, as studies have shown that
attractive faces are judged to be healthier as well (Jones et al., 2001). Therefore, prioritising
the good-looking patients would mean prioritising patients with better prognosis.
The fifth hypothesis is that there would be personal favouritism in prioritisation in the sense
that participants would favour people like themselves:
Hypothesis 5a: Participants who volunteer regularly would favour patients who volunteer
and yet it is possible participants who do not volunteer regularly would favour patients who
did actually volunteer.
Hypothesis 5b: Participants who are above average in intelligence would favour highly
intelligent patients and participants who are below average in intelligence would favour
patients with average intelligence.
Hypothesis 5c: Participants who are above average in EI would favour patients with high
EI and participants who are below average in EI would favour patients with average EI.
Hypothesis 5d: Participants who are above average in terms of attractiveness would favour
good-looking patients and participants who are below average in terms of attractiveness
would favour average-looking patients.
Method
Participants
There were ten participants in the pilot study and 281 participants, in the main study: 146
females, 132 males and 3 unknown. Their ages ranged from 18 to 69 years (M = 26.29, SD = 8.36).
The pilot study participants were London based adults from various backgrounds. The main group
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of participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid £1.00 for their
participation. Around half of the participants were from America and the rest India.
Materials and Design
The first part of this questionnaire described a hypothetical scenario in which a kidney had
become available for transplant. Participants had to rank 16 hypothetical patients, based on the
descriptions provided, in order of preference to receive the kidney. These are seen in Table 1 though
not presented in that order. Randomly generated four-digit numbers were used as patient numbers
to avoid assigning a specific gender to the patients, in case of an interaction with participants’
gender. Participants were also asked to describe the criterion they used to rank the patients,
although this was optional. The second part of the survey requested for demographic data and
several self-estimates on the following characteristics: regularity of volunteering, intelligence, EI,
attractiveness. Pilot work indicated they had no problem with understanding the concepts including
EI. The survey was hosted on the online survey platform, Qualtrics (Version November 2016;
Qualtrics, 2016). Participants accessed the survey via a link using their personal computers or
smartphones.
The four within-subject variables were patient characteristics: regular volunteering
(yes/no), intelligence (high/average), EI (high/average) and attractiveness (good-looking/average-
looking). The five between-subjects variables were: volunteering involvement, intelligence, EI,
attractiveness and participants’ nationality. The order of the hypothetical patients was randomised
across participants to minimise order effects.
Procedure
A pilot study was conducted on ten participants to determine the suitability of the
questionnaire to be used and improvements were made to the questionnaire following feedback
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from the pilot participants. This included changing some wording in the instructions as well as the
descriptions of the potential patients. The final questionnaire was completed by participants
without direct supervision from the researcher. The task was not timed. At the end of the
experiment, a debrief page explaining the experimental aim and hypotheses was displayed to the
participants. Ethical approval was granted by the departmental ethics committee (UCL:
Psychology: CEHP/2013/514.).
Results
The ranks assigned to each hypothetical patient were used in the data analysis. The
descriptions of each patient and their mean rankings is displayed in Table 2.
Within-subjects analysis
A 2 (Volunteering) × 2 (Intelligence) × 2 (EI) × 2 (Attractiveness) repeated measures
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the ranks assigned to the hypothetical patients
to determine if there were significant differences in ranking across these characteristics. All the
patient characteristics were found to be significant. Whether the patient was a volunteer or not had
a significant impact on the ranks, F(1, 280) = 589.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .678, with participants
prioritising patients who volunteered at the food bank (M = 5.99, SD = 3.90) over patients who did
not volunteer (M = 11.01, SD = 3.84). The patients’ intelligence significantly impacted the rank,
F(1, 280) = 208.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .427, with highly intelligent patients (M = 7.22, SD = 4.47)
being favoured over patients with average intelligence (M = 9.78, SD = 4.38). Patients’ EI also
significantly affected the rankings, F(1, 280) = 187.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .402, with patients with
high EI (M = 7.44, SD = 4.55) being prioritised over patients with average EI (M = 9.55, SD =
4.42). Patients’ attractiveness also significantly affected the rankings but to a smaller extent
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compared to the other three variables, F(1, 280) = 10.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .037), with participants
indicating a preference for good-looking patients (M = 8.34, SD = 4.60) over average-looking
patients (M = 8.66, SD = 4.61).
There was also a significant Intelligence × EI interaction, F(1,280) = 9.25, p = .003, ηp2
= .032. A simple effects analysis (Howell, 2007) revealed that the influence of EI was stronger in
highly intelligent patients (high EI, M = 6.05, SD = 4.49; average EI, M = 8.39, SD = 4.13, d =
0.54) than in patients with average intelligence (high EI, M = 8.84, SD = 4.16; average EI, M =
10.71, SD = 4.40, d = 0.44). A significant Volunteering × Intelligence × Attractiveness interaction
was also found, F(1,280) = 9.55, p = .002, ηp2 = .033. A simple effects analysis showed that there
was a greater preference for good-looking patients over average-looking patients under two
specific conditions: when the patient did not volunteer and had average intelligence (good-looking,
M = 11.97, SD = 3.56; average-looking, M = 12.58, SD = 3.41, d = 0.18) and when the patient
volunteered and was highly intelligent (good-looking, M = 4.44, SD = 3.60; average-looking, M =
4.96, SD = 3.70, d = 0.14).
Between-subjects analysis
Following the within-subjects analysis, the five participant variables were examined
separately to see if these affected the way the participants ranked the patients. All the five
participant variables were coded dichotomously. Full results of these split-plot ANOVAs are
available from the third author. The participant volunteering regularity was coded as either
‘frequent’ or ‘infrequent’, their self-reported intelligence, EI and attractiveness was coded as either
‘above average’ or ‘below average’, whilst their nationalities were coded as either ‘Eastern’ or
‘Western’, depending on whether they were from an eastern or western country. A cultural
definition of Eastern and Western countries was used, thus countries in Asia were classified under
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Eastern and Europe, North America and Australia were classified under Western. The number of
participants in each dichotomy is displayed in Table 3. Five separate five-way split-plot ANOVAs
were conducted, with each of the five participant variable (volunteering regularity, intelligence, EI,
attractiveness and nationality) as the between-subject variable and the four patient characteristics
as the within-subjects variables in each analysis. Two, three and four-way interactions were further
analysed.
Participant volunteering frequency interactions. The Participant Volunteering
Frequency × Volunteering interaction was non-significant, F(1, 279) = 0.38, p = .54. There were
three unexpected interactions. The Participant Volunteering Frequency × Volunteering ×
Intelligence × Attractiveness interaction, F(1, 279) = 3.80, p = .052, η2p = .013 and the Participant
Volunteering Frequency × Volunteering × EI × Attractiveness interaction, F(1, 279) = 3.83, p
= .051, η2p = .014 were both marginally significant. There was a significant Participant
Volunteering Frequency × Volunteering × Intelligence × EI × Attractiveness interaction, F(1, 279)
= 3.97, p = .047, η2p = .014. This indicates that the participants’ own volunteering frequency did
not influence how they used any one criteria, but affected the ranking holistically.
Participant intelligence. There was a highly significant Participant Intelligence ×
Intelligence interaction, F(1, 279) = 39.76, p < .001, η2p = .125, with a simple effects revealing
that participants who self-reported as being above average in intelligence showing a stronger
discrimination in their rankings (high intelligence, M = 6.92, SD = 4.38; average intelligence, M =
10.08, SD = 4.28; d = 0.73) than participants who self-reported as being below average in
intelligence (high intelligence, M = 8.14, SD = 4.62; average intelligence, M = 8.86, SD = 4.58; d
= 0.16).There was a significant Participant Intelligence × Volunteering interaction, F(1, 279) =
5.55, p = .019, η2p = .020. A simple effects analysis showed that participants who self-reported as
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being above average in intelligence showing a stronger preference for patients who volunteer
(volunteer, M = 5.85, SD = 3.79; do not volunteer, M = 11.14, SD = 3.75; d = 1.40) than participants
who self-reported as being below average in intelligence (volunteer, M = 6.42, SD = 4.17; do not
volunteer, M = 10.59, SD = 4.06; d = 1.01). There was also a significant Participant Intelligence ×
EI interaction, F(1, 279) = 9.34, p = .002, η2p = .032. A simple effects analysis revealed that
participants who self-reported as being above average in intelligence showing a stronger
preference for patients with high EI (high EI, M = 7.31, SD = 4.52; average EI, M = 9.68, SD =
4.39; d = 0.53) than participants who self-reported as being below average in intelligence (high EI,
M = 7.85, SD = 4.62; average EI, M = 9.15, SD = 4.51; d = 0.28).
Participant EI. The Participant EI × EI interaction was not significant, F(1, 279) = 2.43,
p = .12. However, there was a significant Participant EI × Volunteering × EI interaction, F(1, 279)
= 3.96, p = .048, η2p = .014. A simple effects analysis showed that participants who self-reported
having above-average EI have greater preference for patients who volunteer regularly and have
high EI and lower preference for patients who do not volunteer and have average EI (volunteer
regularly and high EI, M = 4.61, SD = 3.61; do not volunteer and average EI, M = 12.23, SD =
3.47; d = 2.15), than participants who self-reported having below-average EI (volunteer regularly
and high EI, M = 5.43, SD = 4.12; do not volunteer and average EI, M = 11.78, SD = 3.86, d =
1.59).
Participant attractiveness. The Participant Attractiveness × Attractiveness interaction
was not significant, F < 1. There were no significant interactions between participant attractiveness
and any of the other patient variables.
Thus, overall, there was little evidence for in-group biases.
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Discussion
The results show that all four patient variables were significant factors affecting
participants’ ranking of the hypothetical patients, supporting four of the five hypotheses in this
study. The findings that highly intelligent patients and patients who volunteer were prioritised
over those of average intelligence and those who do not volunteer, respectively, are in line with
previous research concerning the same variables (Furnham et al., 2000; Furnham, Thomas, et al.,
2002). The findings that good-looking patients and patients with high EI were prioritised over
average-looking patients and patients with average EI are novel yet further research will be
required in order to confirm that they are replicable.
The largest effect size was found for the volunteering variable, which is based on the use
of the reciprocity principle. People may believe that volunteers deserve priority because they have
helped society in the past. This is aptly supported by participants’ rationale in the belief that “karma
exists” and that “people who do good deserve good”. It is also assumed that patients who
volunteered regularly were also likely to continue volunteering in the future, thus increasing their
instrumental value, namely value to others. The large effect size could partly be due to the fact
that this was the only variable that could be fully controlled by the patients, whilst the other three
variables are to some extent genetically determined. Therefore, participants might have placed
greater importance on this variable when ranking the patients.
A large effect size was also found for the cognitive intelligence variable. Participants
appeared to take a utilitarian perspective when prioritising highly intelligent patients, as confirmed
by their justifications that highly intelligent people were more beneficial to society. Only one
participant approached this criterion from a medical perspective, suggesting that highly intelligent
people might be more likely to adhere to the strict post-transplant medication regimen and has
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been supported amongst people at risk of developing cardiovascular disease (Deary et al., 2009).
This is worthy of note, as having an intellectual disability (ID) or low IQ does not constitute criteria
for exclusion from receiving solid organ transplants. Patients with ID have been reportedly
excluded from organ transplant lists on the basis of other general criteria, such as being incapable
of dutifully adhering to post-transplant medication (Community Ethics Committee, 2014; Veatch,
2001). There were also two significant interactions with the other patient variables: intelligence
interacted with volunteering frequency and attractiveness, and separately with EI. These
interactions suggest that participants were making judgments based on weighted information on
the different patient characteristics.
Additionally, a large effect size was found for the EI variable. Participants favoured patients
with high EI over patients with average EI. This decision was also probably guided by utilitarian
principles, as participants commented that patients with high EI would have a greater positive
impact on their community. Thus, having high EI appears to increase one’s instrumental value.
However, the exact reason as to why they might have a positive impact on their community was
not explained. Nevertheless, one might presume that this is due to them having better relationships
with others as a result of possessing key qualities for successful relationships, such as empathic
perspective-taking and cooperative behaviour (Schutte et al., 2001).
Although a significant result was found for the attractiveness variable, the effect size was
small, suggesting that this was not considered to be a very important criteria. Participants
prioritised good-looking patients over average-looking patients, but it is not certain what the
rationale behind this decision was.
Some, but very few participants provided some explanation/elaboration as to the reasons
for their judgements. Retrospectively it seems a very sensible procedure in order to fully
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understand, rather than simply imply, the rationale for these judgements, however disappointingly
few participants responded to this offer.
Only three participants elaborated on their use of attractiveness as a criteria. Two
participants supported the notion that attractiveness was used as an indicator of a patient’s health,
whilst the other participant approached the variable with a social usefulness perspective,
suggesting that looking at attractive people brings joy to the viewer. There were more participants
who provided justification for prioritising average-looking patients over good-looking patients,
stating that average-looking patients were nicer individuals. This means that the halo effect is
unlikely to be the underlying factor behind the overall preference for good-looking patients,
although it should be noted that this is based on a relatively small number of participants who
elaborated on their rationale for ranking. As there have been no precedence for the investigation
of attractiveness in a scarce resource methodology, the small effect size for the attractiveness
variable suggests that this result needs to be treated with caution.
With regards to the participant-patient characteristics interaction, there were no significant
personal preferences and thus hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d were not supported. This is inconsistent
with the existence of in-group favouritism effects in some of the previous studies, which showed
that left-wing participants favoured left-wing patients whilst right-wing participants favoured
right-wing patients; non-smoking participants favoured non-smoking patients more than smoking
participants and vice versa and white participants prioritised white prisoners over black and vice
versa (Furnham, 1996; Furnham et al., 2000; Furnham, McClelland, & Drummond-Baxter, 2010).
Nonetheless, several of the participants’ characteristics interacted with some of the patient
variables, with participants in different groups discriminating against patients to different extents,
based on a patient characteristic. This is similar to the finding by Furnham et al. (2011) with respect
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to smokers. There were two marginally significant four-way interactions and one significant five-
way interaction for participant volunteering frequency, suggesting that participants who
volunteered frequently ranked the patients a little differently to participants who volunteered
infrequently, although both groups of participants generally preferred patients who volunteered
regularly. There were three two-way interactions between participant intelligence and patient
volunteering behaviour, intelligence and EI respectively. The participant intelligence × patient
intelligence interaction was the strongest out of all three interactions, with the participants who
self-reported as being above average in intelligence differentiating between patients based on their
intelligence to a much greater extent than participants who were below average in intelligence,
who still prioritised highly intelligent patients. Participants who were above average in intelligence
also assigned much higher ranks to patients who volunteered regularly and patients who had high
EI and much lower ranks to patients who did not volunteer and patients who had average EI.
However, for participants who were below average in intelligence, the difference in the mean ranks
for the patient who volunteered and the patient who did not volunteer was much less pronounced,
as was the difference between the patient with high EI and the patient with average EI. These
findings seem to suggest that participants who were above average in (self-rated) intelligence were
more diligent in ranking the patients on the basis of social usefulness, possibly hinting at some
form of elitism. However, these results should be interpreted with caution, as the two groups of
participants are rather unbalanced in numbers. Nonetheless, similar results have been found by
Sachdev and Bourhis (1987): members of experimentally induced high status groups displayed
more favouritism towards in-group members and were more biased against out-group members,
whilst members of experimentally induced low status groups tended to favour high status groups.
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There was a significant three-way Participant EI × Volunteering × EI interaction.
Participants who self-reported as being above average in EI favoured patients who volunteered
and had high EI to a greater extent than participants who self-reported as being below average in
EI. Those who self-reported as being above average in EI also ranked patients who did not
volunteer and had average EI much lower than those who self-reported as being below average. It
is interesting to note that Participant EI did not interaction with EI alone, but interacted with both
Volunteering and EI. According to Mayer, Salovey and Caruso (2000), people high in EI tend to
use their feelings to guide their judgments. Therefore, participants with high EI could have formed
more positive feelings about patients who volunteer regularly and have high EI, thus assigning
them higher ranks and similarly assigning lower ranks to patients whom they have less positive
feelings about (those who did not volunteer and who had average EI).
There were no significant interactions between participants’ self-reported attractiveness
and patient variables, indicating that participants who were above average in attractiveness and
participants who were below average in attractiveness did not differ in their rankings. Interestingly,
this was the only self-reported variable for which the ‘below average’ group is larger than the
‘above average’ group.
A possible limitation of the present research is that the use of a rank-order could have
forced participants to use of criteria to allocate the resource even if they did not want to use any
criteria. Ubel (1999) has found that when the option of equal allocation of resource was not made
explicit, less people chose it as it was not salient. In this study, the option to randomly allocate the
resource and how it might be done (i.e., by submitting the rankings in the order they appeared in,
which were already randomised across participants) was not made explicit. However, the use of
rank-order and not explicitly mentioning the possibility of random allocation were intentional
ALLOCATING SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES
18
choices in designing the experiment, to simulate real-life decision-making where medical
professionals would have to prioritise some patients over others. Nonetheless, future research
could investigate the same four variables but have participants rate each patient on a Likert scale
rather than place them in rank order. In addition, the variables of EI and attractiveness, being novel,
warrant further study.
The rating vs ranking issue has been explored before. The problem arises when large
numbers of participants rate all patients as urgent/equally deserving so in effect making no
decisions at all. Indeed many participants indicate some “discomfort” with this task and complain
of “not wanting to play God or an ethics committee”. The rank order method, therefore more than
the rating method, reveals a participants’ underlying priorities.
Another limitation pertains to the accuracy of the self-ratings of intelligence and emotional
intelligence. We know from previous research in this area that few people are likely to rate
themselves as below average and that the correlation between self-ratings and test scores is around
r=.5 (Furnham, 2016). Nevertheless though skewed the self-ratings are indicative of actual scores.
Conclusion and Implications
This study showed that given minimal data on people wanting to have scarce medical resources
kinder, brighter, more charming and attractive people are prioritised as predicted. Social usefulness
(contribution to others) appears to be rewarded.
This study may have real world implications for those involved in organ donation and acceptance.
Clearly those who volunteer for organ donation would be interested in who might receive their
organs and the criteria by which they are chosen. Equally ethics committees and medical decision
makers may also be interested in what lay people feel is most fair. That is, albeit that it is often
implicit, doners and sometimes ethics committee members follow an allocation principle as
ALLOCATING SCARCE MEDICAL RESOURCES
19
outlined above. This study showed the importance of the reciprocity principle, namely that lay
people believe that those who have given to others by volunteering deserve “repayment” by
prioritization. Future research may explore what particular types of giving to society are thought
of as most deserving of an organ transplant.
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Table 1
Patient description and mean rankings
Description Mean (SD) Rank
A. volunteers regularly at a foodbank Is good-looking, highly
intelligent and of high Emotional Intelligence.
3.30 (3.62) 1
B. volunteers regularly at a foodbank is average-looking, highly
intelligent and of high Emotional Intelligence
3.69 (3.63) 2
C. volunteers regularly at a foodbank is good-looking, highly
intelligent and of average Emotional Intelligence
5.58 (3.20) 3
D. volunteers regularly at a foodbank, is average-looking, highly
intelligent and of average Emotional Intelligence
6.23 (3.32) 4
E. volunteers regularly at a foodbank, is average-looking, and of
average intelligence and high Emotional Intelligence
6.32 (3.48) 5
F. volunteers regularly at a foodbank, is good-looking, and of average
intelligence and high Emotional Intelligence
6.41 (3.50) 6
G. volunteers regularly at a foodbank, is good-looking, and of average
intelligence and average Emotional Intelligence
8.05 (3.55) 7
H. volunteers regularly at a foodbank, is average-looking, and of
average intelligence and average Emotional Intelligence
8.34 (3.81) 8
I. does not do volunteer work, is good-looking, highly intelligent and
of high Emotional Intelligence
8.57 (3.83) 9
J. does not do volunteer work, is average-looking, highly intelligent
and of high Emotional Intelligence
8.62 (3.73) 10
K. does not do volunteer work, is good-looking, highly intelligent and
of average Emotional Intelligence
10.86 (3.42) 11
L. does not do volunteer work, is average-looking, highly intelligent
and of average Emotional Intelligence
10.89 (3.25) 12
M. does not do volunteer work, is good-looking, and of average
intelligence and high Emotional Intelligence
10.99 (3.28) 13
N. does not do volunteer work, is average-looking, and of average
intelligence and high Emotional Intelligence
11.65 (3.05) 14
O. does not do volunteer work, is good-looking, and of average
intelligence and average Emotional Intelligence
12.96 (3.56) 15
P. does not do volunteer work, is average-looking, and of average
intelligence and average
13.51 (3.50) 16
Emotional Intelligence
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Table 2
Number of participants in each group
Participant variable Code N
Volunteering Frequent 162
Infrequent 119
Intelligence Above average 212
Below average 69
Emotional Intelligence Above average 171
Below average 110
Attractiveness Above average 131
Below average 150
Nationality Eastern 100
Western 151
